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CANTWELL SMITH'S PROPOSAL FOR 
A WORLD THEOLOGY 
Eugene Thomas Long 
In Towards a World Theology, Cantwell Smith offers a new approach to the issue of 
conflicting belief claims in the world religions. He argues that most approaches err in 
considering religion in terms of belief rather than faith. He proposes a world theology of 
faith that requires persons to move beyond their particular traditions in order to interpret 
comprehensively the religious faith of human kind. I present Cantwell Smith's central 
thesis, analyzing it in term of the relation between faith and belief. I argue that faith and 
belief are distinguishable but not separable and that to do what Cantwell Smith proposes 
would require an interpretive scheme or metaphysical theory that can be evaluated in 
accordance with its ability to make sense of the experience of humankind. 
Western philosophers of religion and theologians have begun to focus anew on 
the question of conflicting belief claims among the world religions, More frequent 
encounters with persons of different religious beliefs, awareness of man's his-
toricity with the limits that imposes on absolute claims to truth and a new sense 
of the interconnectedness of the histories of persons in the world have contributed 
to this development. Indifference to the issue is no longer a reasonable option 
and traditional solutions do not appear to be adequate, In a recent study, the 
historian of religion, Wilfred Cantwell Smith, argues for a different approach 
to the question of conflicting belief claims in religion, one that emphasizes the 
role of faith rather than belief and one that would issue in a theology of compara-
tive religion or a world theology of faith, 
The key source for his proposal is Towards a World Theology: Faith and the 
Comparative History of Religion, but he assumes in this work his earlier volumes 
entitled Belief and History and Faith and Belief I Cantwell Smith's proposal for 
a world theology is very complex and requires careful analysis of a number of 
important epistemological and linguistic issues. I cannot presume in this essay 
to give adequate treatment to all of these issues but I do hope to present for 
discussion what I believe to be his primary thesis, He is not claiming to have 
provided us with a world theology, and he is not claiming that one person could, 
He seems more intent on provoking philosophers, theologians and historians of 
religion from different traditions to cooperate towards the development of a 
world theology of faith, 
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The expression 'world theology' is, I believe, intentionally provocative. A 
theologian is usually thought of as a person who articulates the faith of his 
community and whose work is judged in some way by the doctrines and creeds 
of that community. But here we have a proposal that theologians go beyond the 
boundaries of their own traditions, that they contribute to a world theology. It 
is clear that this proposal would be contrary to those that maintain exclusive 
truth on the part of one religion and to those that maintain that one religion is 
the fulfillment of or the norm by which other religions are evaluated. It also 
differs from proposals that would argue in one way or another that all religions 
are equally true, as well as from those that seek a syncretism of religious beliefs. 
Cantwell Smith would argue that many, if not all, of these traditional solutions 
to the issue of conflicting belief claims suffer from the same difficulty. They 
are based on a consideration of religion in terms of belief rather than faith. His 
proposal for a world theology is based on an empirical claim, that man's religious 
history is fundamentally a history of faith, not belief. A world theology would 
be a theology of the religious faith of humankind and to this all religious persons 
are being summoned to contribute. Cantwell Smith is not, however, calling on 
Christians, Hindus, Buddhists, Muslims and others to give up their particular 
traditions. He is caIling on them to go beyond their particular traditions in order 
to interpret comprehensively the religious faith of persons throughout the world. 
To understand his proposal we have first to understand his claim that the 
history of religion is fundamentally a history of faith, not belief. Cantwell Smith 
is aware that the distinction between faith and belief has a long history, but he 
believes that the distinction has been essentially lost in much recent history where 
the meaning of 'faith' has tended to converge with the meaning of 'belief' and 
the latter has shifted in meaning from the personal to the impersonal and the 
true to the dubious. When this happens, he argues, faith no longer means trusting 
and responding to the transcendent qualities in one's environment but means 
assenting to a series of dubious or problematic propositions. 
Cantwell Smith speaks of faith in several ways but in each case he seems to 
have in mind what one might call an evaluative rather than a factual meaning 
of faith. He seems most intent on distinguishing faith from dubious commitment 
and "mere belief', but he also intends to distinguish it from belief that something 
is the case. It is one thing to believe that fairies exist and another to believe that 
tables exist. In both cases, however, belief can be distinguished from faith. 
Faith in the evaluative sense has more to do with such words as 'trust', 
'commitment', 'loyalty' and 'confidence' than with such claims as 'X is the 
case' or 'X is true'. The closest analogies to religious faith can be found in 
personal relationships where one speaks of having faith in one's friend or one's 
wife. If I say that I have faith in my friend, I am saying something other than 
I believe this or that about him, although I would say that such beliefs are at 
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least implicit in my faith. You might, for example, believe that my friend is 
untrustworthy and I might still have faith in him but it would be very odd for 
me to have faith in him and also believe that he is untrustworthy. 
I will return later to the question of the relation between faith and belief. The 
important point now is that faith in the evaluative sense be understood to refer 
to a personal or existential attitude not to intellectual assent to a set of propositions. 
When Cantwell Smith speaks of the history of religion as a history of faith he 
is speaking of faith in this evaluative sense. From this perspective what separates 
the theist from the atheist is not that one believes to be true the proposition 'God 
exists' and the other does not (although this may also be the case). It is that one 
is committed to, trusts in what theists call God and the other does not. This is 
the insight suggested in Nietzsche's assertion, "That we find no God ... is not 
what differentiates us, but that we experience what has been revered as God, 
not as 'godlike' but as miserable, as absurd, as harmful, not merely as an error 
but as a crime against life. We deny God as God. If one were to prove this God 
of the Christians to us, we should be even less able to believe [have faith] in 
him."2 Cantwell Smith makes a similar point with regard to the Islamic tradition 
where he says that historically it was never a question of not believing in God. 
The infidel was the one who said no, who responded negatively to God whereas 
the man of faith said yes, committed himself to God.' 
According to Cantwell Smith, then, religious faith is an act of loyalty or 
commitment. Sometimes he uses the term 'response' which suggests more clearly 
perhaps that he intends that faith be understood as more than a mere psychological 
state. Faith is a response or commitment to God, or more neutrally to some 
transcendent reality in human history. But religious faith is also said to be 
cognitive, to include some kind of understanding, discernment or insight. Rec-
ognizing the cogency of a logical argument, the goodness of a cup of cold water 
given in love, and the horrendous evil of Auschwitz are analogies given to suggest 
what is meant by religious discernment or insight and religious insight is said 
to be on a grander scale than any of these. 4 At one point religious faith is spoken 
of as "an organising principle, by which the person is open to the infinite and 
is enabled to see all that is finite in relation to the infinite."5 
Cantwell Smith seems to have in mind something like what Ian Ramsey 
referred to as discernment in disclosure situations. What is discerned or under-
stood is not merely the particular facts or propositions but a depth which goes 
beyond the collection of facts or propositions. 'Things came together', we might 
say. We see things in a new way. Faith as insight is a total kind of insight, the 
kind that leads us to say that 'X is a good man' rather than 'X performs good 
actions'. Taking the example of Auschwitz, we might say that it is one thing to 
know all the partial assertions associated with it. It is another for the dreadful 
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horror to strike us in an overpowering manner. The discernment of religious 
faith would seem to be something like this except that it goes beyond to what 
concerns us ultimately. 
Religious faith then, as Cantwell Smith understands it, is different from 
assenting to propositions that are held to be true. It involves discernment and 
commitment or insight and response in some total or unconditional sense. It 
seems fairly clear that this view of faith is an example of the so-called non-prop-
ositional or heilsgeschichtliche view. God reveals himself in history, not propo-
sitions to be believed, and faith is saying yes to God's presence in history. Faith 
is man's participation in God's history.6 But can we say more than this? Can 
we be more descriptive concerning this attitude of insight and commitment? In 
one place Cantwell Smith speaks of religious faith as "a way of seeing whatever 
one sees and of handling whatever one handles; a capacity to live at more than 
a mundane level, to see, to feel, to act in terms of a transcendent dimension." 
In the same context he speaks of religious faith as a "quiet confidence and joy 
which enables one to feel at home in the universe, and to find meaning in the 
world and in one's own life, a meaning that is profound and ultimate, and is 
stable no matter what may happen to oneself at the level of immediate event."7 
Religious faith in this sense is contrasted with nihilism, with the inability to find 
significance in the world, the absence of mutuality, a total dependence on 
immediate events and a sense of alienation. 
Understood in this way religious faith would appear to be some kind of ultimate 
or cosmic trust, a confidence that somehow, perhaps in spite of immediate events 
to the contrary, life makes sense. At times it sounds as if faith may be merely 
a kind of subjective ordering or "seeing as", but this is not Cantwell Smith's 
intent 8 Something is given, something is discerned and faith is a response. This 
would seem to suggest that Reality itself must have the sort of character that 
could evoke this discernment and response but this idea is not developed. Exactly 
what Cantwell Smith wants to say here is not clear to me. He wants to place 
religious faith in an ontological context but it is not clear to what faith is committed 
ontologically. Perhaps he would say that faith is a discernment of and commitment 
to ultimate reality understood as supportive and trustworthy, although he would 
want to remind us of the well-known story of the elephant and the four blind 
men from Burmah. In this story no one man apprehends the elephant as a whole 
and by analogy Cantwell Smith would argue that no one religious faith apprehends 
reality as a whole. 
One additional point needs to be made about Cantwell Smith's understanding 
of faith and then we may look more directly to his proposal for a world theology 
of faith. Faith, as understood here, is not merely an individual insight and 
commitment. Faith is said to signify "that human quality that has been expressed 
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in, has been elicited, nurtured, and shaped by, the religious traditions of the 
world. o Faith is said in some sense to precede and transcend the traditions in 
which it emerges but it is also said to be nourished and patterned by the tradition. 
Indeed in some traditions belief is said not to play the important role that it does 
in Christianity. While the primary expression of Christian faith has been concep-
tually in terms of propositions to be believed, this is not the case in all other 
religions. In some African religions, for example, a ritual dance may be the 
primary expression of faith. And in the Jewish and Islamic traditions, law, not 
doctrine, has been the fundamental expression of faith. Even within the Christian 
tradition the degree of importance of ritual and doctrine may differ. 10 
Historians can show, argues Cantwell Smith, that faith has been a relatively 
constant factor in the religions of the world and that there is much less difference 
between the faith of a Hindu, a Christian, a Buddhist, and a Muslim than there 
is between the various symbols and formulas by which faith is expressed. To 
speak of Hindu or Muslim faith is to speak not of their beliefs but of their 
discernment and commitment, of the coherent or meaningful pattern into which 
the various data of life fit. This concept of faith can provide the foundation upon 
which we can think globally about religion even when our traditions and beliefs 
differ. It is said that this global as opposed to particular reflection on faith is 
becoming possible today because the horizons of our particular histories are 
being expanded as a result of global communications. 
Cantwell Smith is not unaware of many of the difficulties in his proposal. To 
the extent, for example, that faith is not belief and to the extent that it is an 
insight or discernment by which we see the finite in terms of the infinite, one 
community's faith is in principle excluded from being the object of another 
community's theology. Faith, he says, ··can be theologised only from the inside. "II 
This would seem to doom the proposal from the start. If one cannot without 
distortion undertake a theology of faith from outside a particular community of 
faith, then why should one propose the category of faith as the foundation of a 
world theology? At best, it would seem, one could do a theology of one's own 
faith while remaining agnostic about other faiths. This might represent an 
improvement over exclusivistic views but would hardly provide a basis for a 
world theology. 
Cantwell Smith's answer to this problem is that we need to take more seriously 
the dynamics of historical processes. In our time of global communications 
historical processes are said to have begun that will allow us to go beyond the 
limits of our particular histories to a point where we can begin to talk about faith 
as more than Christian, more than Islamic and so forth. It is not a syncretism 
of religious beliefs that is being proposed but a theology of faith which would 
be greater than, more comprehensive than any particular faith. It is argued that 
this would be in part a recovery of something lost. For example, the early 
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Christians proclaimed that in Christ faith had become possible. This differs from 
proclaiming the Christian faith. The notion of the Christian faith or the Islamic 
faith as opposed to faith in a Christian or Islamic form is, according to Cantwell 
Smith, a relatively recent one. It was not until the nineteenth century, he claims, 
that we began to speak in terms of particular faiths and this happened at a time 
when faith came to be regarded as belief. Here is the root of the problem. Instead 
of faith in a Christian form we have Christian beliefs and these beliefs are set 
over against the beliefs of others. This, he says, was the first and not too 
successful effort of the Christian Church to deal with the new pluralism. 
Cantwell Smith's historical point is that until recently faith was not thought 
of as Christian faith or Muslim faith but as faith in a Christian or Muslim context. 
It was only when the religious people of the world began to encounter each other 
that they began to speak of the Christian faith and the Muslim faith. And when 
they speak this way they actually mean the Christian beliefs and the Muslim 
beliefs. 12 Now, however, we are in a new era. Historical studies show us that 
religion has to do primarily with faith, not belief, and faith in a particular context 
not a particular faith. Put this together with the claim that today as a result of 
global communications we are beginning to see our particular histories as parts 
of a global history of humankind and we have his proposal for a world theology, 
"a theology for which 'the religions' are the subject not the object; a theology 
that emerges out of 'all religions of the world,' or I would say, all the religious 
communities of the world, or better still (incipiently) all the religious sub-com-
munities of the world human community."13 
Cantwell Smith is not claiming to have provided a world theology of faith. 
His primary aim seems to be that of getting his readers to look at the issue of 
religious pluralism in a new way. First we must think of religion in terms of 
faith and faith is universal, not particular. Faith does come to expression in 
particular contexts but just because of this we should think not of Christian faith 
or Islamic faith but of faith in a Christian or Islamic context. And from within 
these contexts we are encouraged to think universally and comprehensively about 
faith and thus contribute to a world theology of faith. 'Theology", he writes, 
"is critical intellectualisation of (and for) faith, and of the world as known in 
faith; and what we seek is a theology that will interpret that history of our race 
in a way that will give intellectual expression to our faith, the faith of all of us, 
and to our modern perception of the world. "14 It is not expected that theologians 
and philosophers will give up their particular traditions but that somehow they 
will transcend them in the direction of a theology of the faith of humankind. 
The data of his theology would be the data of the history of religious faith. It 
would be a comprehensive interpretation of the faith of humankind and such a 
theology should be in principle acceptable and cogent to all persons of faith. 
SMITH'S PROPOSAL FOR A WORLD THEOLOGY 9 
"The task of theology is to make rationally intelligible the meaning of human 
life in faith, and of the world in which that faith is lived. "15 Indeed the aim is 
to make faith intelligible to all persons both secular and religious. 
In 1953 Alban Widgery, a philosopher of history and religion, published a 
book entitled What Is Religion? In this volume Widgery spoke of the tendency 
of many historians of religion to focus primarily on the beliefs and doctrines of 
the world religions and suggested the need for historians to return from doctrines 
to experience, to try to discover the experiences that led to the beliefs. Cantwell 
Smith is doing just this. He is pointing to the important distinction between what 
I would call experience of the transcendent dimensions in human history and 
the various images and doctrines through which we give expression to this 
experience. He has shown, based on a study of several world religions, that this 
kind of distinction is not limited to the western tradition. If this be the case then 
discussions of world religions that are limited to describing and comparing beliefs 
and doctrines may never get to the heart of the history of religions. Our belief 
systems are not themselves revelation. Rather they reflect our efforts to understand 
and interpret our encounters with the transcendent dimensions of human experi-
ence. Just because of this our formulations are always subject to evaluation by 
the experiences of the communities of faith. This accounts for changes which 
take place in our belief systems as a result of wider experience and critical 
evaluation. And this is why, according to Cantwell Smith, one may be said to 
be a Christian or a Buddhist to the extent that one participates in the historical 
process called Christianity or Buddhism. 
At the foundation of all world religions, Cantwell Smith argues, is the experi-
ence of faith, a discernment and response to the transcendent dimension within 
human history. Faith in this sense is different from unjustified belief in a set of 
dubious propositions. It is also different from entertaining or believing the most 
probable hypothesis or set of propositions. Faith is not knowledge and it is not 
a second best substitute for knowledge. It is different from belief or knowledge 
in this sense. Faith, one might say, is an existential attitude of discernment and 
commitment in which the faithful is totally or unconditionally committed to the 
transcendent dimensions of human experience. Understood in this way faith is 
not reducible to some set of beliefs. Faith in God, for example, is not reducible 
to believing that God exists any more than faith in my wife is reducible to 
believing that my wife exists. 
Cantwell Smith seems to me to be correct in distinguishing faith from belief 
and in referring to faith as the fundamental religious category. It is one thing, 
however, to say that faith and belief are distinguishable, another to say that they 
are separable. How Cantwell Smith stands on this issue is not always clear to 
me. I myself would argue that faith is distinguishable from belief, is not reducible 
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to belief but is inseparable from belief. Beliefs it seems to me are always at least 
implicit in faith. It is difficult, for example, to think of what it means for me 
to have faith in my wife if I do not believe that she exists, that she is steadfast 
in character and so forth. Certainly if I do not believe that she exists, it would 
make no sense for me to talk about having faith in her although I might have 
faith in some ideal. In a related way it would seem that at least implicit in 
religious faith is the belief that the object of devotion is worthy of my devotion. 
And if I speak of religious faith as an attitude of ultimate trust, an attitude in 
which I find meaning rather than absurdity in life, it would seem that I must 
then believe that Reality is trustworthy or meaningful. 
The inseparableness of faith and belief is a crucial factor in our consideration 
of Cantwell Smith's proposal for a world theology. Faith comes to expression 
in different forms and faith is also connected with different beliefs, some of 
which seem to be in conflict. Even within one form of religious faith such as 
Christianity there are, for example, disputes concerning whether or not faith in 
this form requires belief that a transcendent being exists. The images and symbols 
in which faith comes to expression and is nourished are not authoritative in 
themselves. They direct us below the surface to the appearance of the transcendent 
in experience. But they are not merely evocative. They also intend to say some-
thing. To speak, for example, of God as king or husband is to point us towards 
some pattern of experience but it is also to express some belief, that God is like 
this. And this becomes more explicit in the more formal doctrinal or creedal 
statements. The issue is not one of faith or belief, experience or formulation, 
but of recognizing that the various expressions of faith whether vivid images or 
creedal formulations have no authority in themselves, that they must ultimately 
point us toward those patterns of experience that we call religious. 
Perhaps Cantwell Smith would agree that faith and belief are inseparable if 
understood in the way suggested above. Perhaps he would also agree that the 
symbolic expressions of faith intend to say something, to make some tmth claims 
if we recognize that they are not authoritative in themselves. If so, we still have 
the issue that he brings clearly to our attention, that our efforts to give expression 
to faith in vivid images and creedal formulations are rooted in our particular 
histories. To understand the symbolic language of Christian faith, for example, 
requires knowledge of that particular history and this sets limits to our ability 
to discuss religious questions across cultural lines. One could, of course, argue 
that every religion has its own language game and that the terms can be understood 
only in the context of the particular language games. Even such terms as truth 
are at times understood to be relative to the particular language games. But this 
is not Cantwell Smith's intent. In calling for a comprehensive interpretation of 
faith he is calling for persons to look beyond their particular histories and to 
contribute to a world theology of faith. 
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The fundamental issue, I believe, is that of finding a more universal or essen-
tially self-interpreting language of faith, and this I am inclined to say is the task 
of what might be called philosophical theology. That is, if I want to try to make 
sense of the particular expressions of, for example, Christian faith, I will need 
to show how the expressions of faith can be placed on a universal map of man's 
experience of existence and being. This is important not only for communicating 
with other religious and non-religious persons, but also for deciding whether or 
not the beliefs implicit in faith can be justified. In other words, what is needed 
is an interpretive scheme or metaphysics in the context of which the particular 
forms of faith can be understood. 
Is it this or something like this that Cantwell Smith has in mind when he 
speaks of world theology as an attempt "to interpret intellectually all human 
faith, one's own and others'; comprehensively, and justly?,,16 I am not sure how 
he would answer this question. If we were proposing a rationalist type of 
metaphysical scheme in which one attempts to grasp the transcendent in rational 
terms.it is clear that he would have reservations. But if we understand interpretive 
scheme to refer to efforts to show that religious faith issues in a world view or 
metaphysical theory which may be judged true or false in accordance with its 
ability to make sense of the whole range of the experience of humankind, then 
it might be more acceptable to him. Whether or not there could be one such 
comprehensive interpretive scheme seems to me to be questionable. At a minimum 
any comprehensive schemes that are proposed would have to be open-ended, 
subject to correction by ranges of experience not adequately treated. And we 
would have to keep in mind that the interpretive schemes are not authoritative 
in themselves, that in some sense they always refer us back to human experience 
in relation to which they can be evaluated. I? 
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